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1. Introduction 
Over the last 35 years or so, the world economy has witnessed a plethora of phenomena. Of notice, 
one could quote the Great Moderation of the 1980s and 1990s and the Global Financial Crisis of 
2008-09. The Great Moderation is illustrated by the dramatic fall in macroeconomic volatility in the 
United States and many other industrialized economies starting in the early to mid-1980s. During the 
Great Moderation period, central banks followed a policy rule which optimized their own country’s 
domestic macroeconomic performance, setting up policies aiming at long-run price stability, and 
moving away from discretionary policies (see Oudiz and Sachs, 1984; and Taylor, 1985 and 2013). 
In this context, as part of the policy framework that was characteristic of the Great Moderation 
period, many industrialized economies started using inflation targeting (IT) regimes. Central banks 
in countries that have adopted IT tend to determine monetary policy based on output and price 
fluctuations from their targets; i.e., central banks will be following “Taylor rules”. The IT approach 
became more explicit with the strategies adopted in the early 1990s by a number of pioneering central 
banks, including the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the 
Bank of Sweden, and the Reserve Bank of Australia. Over the past 20 years or so, variants of the IT 
framework have proliferated in emerging market economies, including Brazil, Chile, Israel, the 
Republic of Korea, Mexico, South Africa, and in a few transition economies such as the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland (Bernanke, 2003). The impact of IT on price stability in industrialized 
economies has been broadly addressed in the literature and there has been growing interest in 
understanding the effects of IT on output growth performance in emerging market economies.  
As argued in the 2014 World Development Report (Risk and Opportunity – Managing Risk for 
Development), high inflation can negatively affect the saving and investment decision of households 
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and firms and, as a consequence, lead to slower economic growth and hurt disproportionally the poor 
and the more vulnerable (World Bank, 2014). The literature on IT shows that IT adopters have been 
largely able to deliver low and stable inflation rates (see Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007a). As 
argued by Mishkin (2004), the success of the IT approach rests on an improved understanding of the 
monetary transmission channels and on three strong institutional factors that include: (a) a clear 
mandate to and commitment by central banks to maintain price stability; (b) central bank 
independence from political interference; and (c) greater central bank accountability to meet the 
target. In addition to that, Eichengreen et al. (1999) argue that a successful IT regime will have to 
meet a few pre-conditions, including (i) a well-developed technical infrastructure at the central bank 
to do inflation forecasting and modeling; (ii) a proper economic structure in the country where prices 
must be deregulated, the economy is mostly immune to commodity price fluctuations and not 
dollarized; and (iii) a healthy financial system so that the IT regime does not generate potential 
conflicts with financial stabilization objectives. For countries that do not meet these pre-conditions, 
Laurens et al. (2015) recommend the adoption of transitional arrangements before a full-fledged IT 
regime can be adopted. These interim arrangements would include the development of economic 
analysis capacity and a forward-looking approach to monetary policy, with interest-rate focused 
operating procedures, to achieve inflation objectives. 
With this background, this paper reexamines the interactions between interest rates (the central 
bank policy variables) and exchange rates in emerging market economies (EMEs) using the IT 
framework. Since floating exchange rate mechanisms have become increasingly more prevalent in 
emerging markets, it is worthwhile reconsidering issues arising from studies connecting interest rates 
to exchange rates. By the ex-ante uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition in international finance, 
higher yielding currencies are expected to depreciate against the (foreign) lower paying counterpart. 
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In practice, however, this condition is often violated and confirms the theoretical notion that exchange 
rates are determined by much more than interest rate differentials. Flood and Rose (2002) investigate 
this for a period of turbulence in financial markets and conclude that UIP performed relatively better 
during the crisis of the 1990s than other times. Frankel and Poonawala (2010) confirm that the UIP 
condition is not observed (ex-post) in emerging markets, although the rejection is not as severe as in 
industrial countries where a persistent negative term on the interest rate differentials coefficient has 
been documented: that is, positive interest rate differentials imply a stronger currency in industrial 
economies, all else constant.  
In contributing to this growing literature, this paper investigates whether central banks in EMEs 
have been able to avoid exchange rate volatility better by using an active monetary policy than in the 
case of non-IT countries. This is an important question that may have implications for the policy rule 
followed by central banks in emerging market economies. Our empirical approach involves, in a first 
stage, using static and dynamic fixed effects models to assess whether the exchange rate in general is 
an important determinant in the reaction function of EMEs’ central banks. We then use an alternative 
methodology, which allows us to control for potential endogeneity problems implicit in the 
specification of a Taylor rule not addressed in recent related literature. We do this by estimating our 
empirical model using system generalized method of moments (SGMM) techniques, which take into 
consideration the endogeneity of inflation, output, and the exchange rate in our model. A common 
finding in our estimations was the poor performance of the output gap as a determinant of the interest 
rate in every specification. This might be interpreted as an indication that, whether they target inflation 
or not, EMEs’ central banks are more cautions today about inflation than about other developments 
in the economy, including exchange rate variations. We test the robustness of our results by 
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partitioning the sample into inflation targeting and non-targeting countries, and then splitting the 
sample across time and dividing it into two periods, before and after the financial crisis.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the recent evidence on the effects of IT 
focusing in particular on exchange rate volatility and the literature that has discussed the role of the 
exchange rate on the central bank reaction function in emerging market economies. Section 3 
describes the data and their sources, and presents the empirical model we use in our econometric 
analysis. Section 4 discusses the empirical results, including the results of robustness checks. Section 
5 concludes and presents a brief discussion of the policy implications associated with our findings. 
2. Inflation targeting and the exchange rate in emerging markets 
One of the main messages of the literature on inflation targeting is that it has been effective in 
achieving price stability without necessarily leading to a better output growth performance. Following 
the seminal work by Ball and Sheridan (2005), a number of studies assessed the impacts of IT on 
inflation and growth under similar methodologies and alternative approaches with a new emphasis on 
emerging markets. Batini and Laxton (2007) use a sample of 44 emerging markets to assess the effects 
of inflation targeting on diverse macroeconomic indicators directly and indirectly related to inflation 
performance. They find that IT provides a significant 4.8% reduction in average inflation, a 3.6% 
reduction in its volatility (standard deviation) and lower output gap volatility. On other dimensions 
indirectly related to inflation per se, they observe a reduction in the volatility of real interest rates and 
exchange rates.  
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007a) employ a panel VAR analysis using emerging and 
industrial economies to assess IT effects on disinflation, exposition to shocks and monetary policy 
independence. Besides finding success in attaining price stability and a lower response to oil shocks, 
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in terms of monetary policy independence they observe that domestic nominal interest rates are less 
exposed to foreign interest rate innovations. For emerging market economies, in particular, this 
achievement is more important and increasing when economies achieve stationary targets. For a more 
complete analysis of early assessments of IT effects, see also the works compiled by Loayza and Soto 
(2002), Fraga et al. (2003), and Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007b).  
More recently, a number of authors have discussed the effects of IT in different types of 
economies. Roger (2009) offers a comprehensive review, which starts with IT adoptions New Zealand 
and Canada in 1990 and 1991, respectively. Also Brito and Bystedt (2010), studying the effects of IT 
on emerging markets using dynamic panel data methods, find no evidence that IT improves the 
performance of inflation and output growth. Although in their work there seems to be some indication 
that IT reduces inflation, this reduction is not robust to alterations in the control group of non-IT 
countries. They even report lower output growth after IT adoption. Agénor and Pereira da Silva (2013) 
discuss a variety of factors relevant to the developing world within the IT framework. Also, Canuto 
and Cavallari (2013) address the implications of monetary policy’s neglect of asset price booms and 
busts, as well as how to integrate macro prudential factors into central bank policy.  
Mollick, Cabral and Carneiro (2008, 2011) blended the economic growth model with IT and 
examined the effects of IT on output per capita growth using the database of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2007) with samples of industrial and emerging economies facing increasing trade and financial 
integration for the period 1986- 2004. In those studies, the authors adopted a real output growth 
perspective and introduced controls for factors such as globalization (trade and capital flows) as well 
as IT. They found that the adoption of a fully-fledged IT regime results in higher output and income 
per capita.  
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In a time series context for a country by country empirical analysis, Moura and Carvalho 
(2010) used forecasting techniques and found that Mexico and Brazil pursue a “tough” monetary 
policy, Chile and Peru pursue “mild” monetary policy against inflation, while Argentina, Colombia, 
and Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela do not change nominal interest rates in response to inflation, 
thus following “lax” policies. In their analysis, changes in the nominal exchange rate only appear to 
have an impact in Mexico during the period from January 1999 to January 2008. Civcir and 
Akcaglayan (2010) performed a VAR analysis for Turkey before and after the country adopted 
inflation targeting in early 2001. They found that nominal exchange rate deviations from its trend had 
a positive impact on interest rates after IT adoption, but not before. Another issue investigated in the 
literature is the extent to which “strict IT” adopters (implying a fully flexible exchange rate) perform 
better or worse than those that adopt a “flexible IT” regime (which results in foreign exchange 
interventions to moderate exchange rate volatility). Berganza and Broto (2012) examine 18 emerging 
markets that have adopted IT and a control group of 19 non-IT countries from 1995Q1 to 2010Q1 
and find that foreign exchange (FX) interventions in some IT countries have been more effective to 
lower volatility than in non-IT countries. Cabral (2010) uses an asymmetric two-country model and 
shows that although dollarization is an effective device to achieve price stability and avoid credibility 
problems small open economies might be better off under a flexible regime than under dollarization 
following any symmetric or asymmetric shock. This suggests that the exchange rate regime is 
important and may incur a pass-through effect to interest rates that is not as straightforward as it may 
have been suggested.  
Whether the central bank should target the exchange rate or not is also a matter of debate in 
the theoretical literature. In an overview of the early literature, Taylor (2001) concludes that monetary 
policy rules that, in addition to output and inflation, also react directly to the exchange rate do not 
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work much better in stabilizing inflation and real output since exchange rate movements are already 
indirectly taken into consideration in an IT framework. Leitemo and Södeström (2005) use a New 
Keynesian open economy model and arrive at similar results, which suggest that including the 
exchange rate in the Taylor interest rate rule provides no gains even under exchange rate uncertainty.  
Contrasting evidence is presented by Wollmershaüser (2006), who follows closely the idea of 
Leitemo and Söderström. He shows that under a significant degree of exchange rate uncertainty, open 
economy rules become superior to simple policy rules that merely target output and inflation. 
Similarly, Pavasuthipaisit (2010) uses an open economy Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE) model to examine monetary policy under commitment and shows that, in the absence of 
complete information, the exchange rate might provide useful information for the policy making 
process and therefore it might be beneficial for the central bank to act upon the exchange rate. Also 
using a DSGE model, Garcia et al. (2011) assess whether including the exchange rate in the central 
bank policy rule helps economic performance across economies with strong and vulnerable financial 
markets. They observe that there are benefits associated with smoothing the exchange rate for both 
types of economies but, due to the pervasive effects of the demand on exchange rate movements, 
smoothing is more beneficial for financially vulnerable emerging markets than across financially 
strong industrial economies.  
The literature above suggests that there is merit in considering the exchange rate as part of the 
central bank policy decisions. Indeed, the literature provides an extensive list of factors for the 
purpose of explaining exchange rates, including inter alia (relative) money supplies, output growth, 
price movements and net foreign asset positions. Rossi (2013) reviews the literature on exchange rate 
forecasting and documents the relevance of “Taylor-rule” or net foreign assets (related to financial 
globalization) in forecasting exercises for several advanced economies using a variety of methods.  
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This paper uses the central bank reaction function as framework for the interest rate-exchange 
rate relationship in emerging market economies. The literature reviewed above suggests that the 
exchange rate has a role in determining the policy variable, although in varying degrees across 
emerging markets.1 The literature also indicates a wide range of topics underlying the interest rate-
exchange rate nexus within IT. Our empirical research approach is close to Aizenman, Hutchison, 
and Noy (2011) who estimate a Taylor rule reaction function for 16 emerging-market countries for 
the period 1989Q1 to 2006Q4 employing fixed-effects panel data methods. Our analysis differs from 
them in at least two important ways. First, we employ dynamic panel methods, which are better at 
controlling for potential endogeneity problems that emerge from having inflation and exchange rate 
variations on the right-hand side. With this, we allow for effects from interest rates (the policy 
variable) to currency, which is consistent with the UIP literature. It is also reasonable to assume that 
increases in domestic rates will affect the output and inflation gaps: a contractionary monetary policy 
that increases interest rates is expected to reduce any positive output and inflation gaps. Second, we 
expand the sample of countries and consider the effects of the recent financial crisis on the way that 
central banks respond to exchange rate developments but also to the rest of the variables in their 
reaction function. These considerations lead us to propose alternative empirical strategies to the fixed-
effects modeling by Aizenman, Hutchison, and Noy (2011). 
3. Empirical approach 
                                                            
1 Exchange rates may, of course, lead to inflationary effects, which forms an empirical matter of its own. Nogueira and 
León-Ledesma (2009), for example, use monthly data from 1995M1 to 2007M12 for Brazil and estimate inflation as a 
function of its past, real output growth, changes in nominal exchange rates, and changes in the price of foreign imports. 
They find that, after the policy change and adoption of IT in 1999M1 long-run exchange rate pass-through declined 
dramatically. Under the peg, exchange rate changes are more fully transmitted to prices. Also, under a credible IT nominal 
shocks are expected to have only limited effects on inflation. 
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Our sample comprises 24 emerging market economies: nine are inflation targeters and 15 are 
non-targeters. The period analyzed extends from the first quarter of 2000 to the second quarter of 
2015, following periods of turmoil in the late 1990s for emerging markets, including the Asian crisis 
of 1997-98, the Russian debt crisis of 1998 and the Brazilian abandon of its pegged exchange rate 
regime in early 1999. The main source for our data is the IMF International Financial Statistics; only 
the interest rates were taken from individual country sources. Interest rates are the benchmark policy 
rates (or, alternatively, the money market, discount or short-term T-bill rates if the benchmark is not 
available), inflation is measured by consumer price index (CPI) changes in all countries, and real 
gross domestic product (RGDP) gap is RGDP growth compared to trend generated by Hodrik-
Prescott (HP) filter. Exchange rates are the bilateral currency of each emerging market against the 
U.S. dollar (USD). We also collected real exchange rates for currencies of emerging markets against 
a basket of currencies but there were less data availability in this case to operate consistently across 
countries. For this reason, we will focus below on the estimates of each currency against the USD. 
Table 1 lists the countries and their respective averages of inflation, interest rates, GDP growth 
and nominal exchange rates against the U.S. dollar. In terms of inflation, two digit rates are reported 
only across non-IT countries (Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Nigeria) and the highest average 
inflation among ITers is observed in Brazil with 6.62%. Two digits average interest rates are observed 
in five non-IT countries (Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Nigeria and Pakistan) but only 
in one inflation targeter (Brazil). The four fastest growing economies in the sample are part of the 
group of non-targeters: China (9.87%), Nigeria (8.05%) and Panama (7.27%). Across the inflation 
targeters the two with the highest average GDP growth rates are Peru (5.81%) and the Philippines 
(5.1%). As for exchange rate changes, three countries in the sample of non-targeters are dollarized 
economies: Panama (since 1904), Ecuador (2000) and El Salvador (2001). Because of this they 
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observe no exchange rate changes. Across the inflation targeters the highest average exchange rate 
changes are reported in Brazil and, across non-targeters, in Argentina, which was subject to a currency 
crisis in the early part of the sample (2001 and 2002). 
Some stylized facts can also be validated when we compare targeter and non-targeter group 
averages. For instance, inflation targeters show lower average inflation (3.97%) relative to the non-
inflation targeters (6.27%). Given this lower inflation, the group of targeters also present lower 
nominal interest rates (6.41%) than their counterparts (7.15%). Inflation targeters also experience 
lower economic growth (3.58%) than non-targeters (5.15%). Finally, ITers observe significant lower 
exchange rate variability (0.28%) than non-inflation targeters (0.73%). This last property makes our 
sample particularly different from earlier ones, such as Aizenman et al. (2011), who collect quarterly 
data from 1989 to 2006 for 16 countries (11 inflation targeters and 5 non-inflation targeters) and 
report average changes in real exchange rates of 2.50% for inflation targeters and -0.49% for non-
inflation targeters, which yields a close to 3% real exchange rate depreciation for targeters compared 
to non-targeters. In contrast, in our sample from 2000 to 2015, countries that follow IT practices have 
their currencies fluctuating by much less when compared to non-IT adopters.2 
3.1 The model 
We employ a panel data approach that allows us to consider an aggregate specification for all 
countries in the sample. Following Aizenman, Hutchison, and Noy (2011), who run Taylor rule-type 
                                                            
2 In Aizenman et al. (2011), real GDP growth was relatively close across samples: 1.11% versus 1%. However, their 
figures were similar to ours on monetary policy: inflation targeters show lower average inflation (5.40%) relative to the 
non-inflation targeters (9.60%) and the group of targeters present lower nominal interest rates (8.98%) than their 
counterparts (12.68%). Therefore, in addition to slower economic growth for ITers in our sample, the rate of change of 
exchange rates is much lower for ITers on average: 0.28% versus 0.73%. 
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regressions in a panel data context for 16 emerging market countries, we estimate the corresponding 
dynamic specification for nominal interest rates as follows: 
iit = 0 + 1iit-1 + 2(yit – yi*) + 3it  + 4eit + jXit + it                (1), 
where: i is the interest rate, (yit – yi*) is the output gap, it is the inflation rate, and e is the bilateral 
nominal exchange rate currency against the USD and Xit is a vector of additional control variables, 
including an IT dummy for countries that adopted the regime, a financial crisis dummy that takes the 
value of unity after the third quarter of 2007, and an interaction between these two and exchange rate 
variations. The subscripts index countries (i) and time (t). The coefficients interpretations are as 
follows: 0 < 1 < 1 is the interest rate smoothing parameter, 2 measures deviations of output from its 
potential (estimated by HP filter), 3 measures effect of inflation on the interest rate, and 4 is the 
coefficient of exchange rates (nominal or real) affecting the policy variable. Both 2 and 3 should be 
> 0 under IT. Correspondingly, the exchange rate indicates the extent of currency movements against 
a major foreign currency (USD). If 4 ≠ 0 in (1), this channel is operative.3 Aizenman, Hutchison, 
and Noy (2011) employ a fixed-effects least-squares procedure (LSDV) and find 2 to be positive and 
statistically significant in the baseline model for countries that adopt IT (and, for non-IT countries, 
positive only when RER is included), 3 is not statistically significant, and 4 is positive and 
statistically significant in the baseline model: 0.07 for IT countries and 0.13 for non-IT countries. The 
latter implies that, in response to a depreciation of the real effective exchange rate, central banks in 
their sample of 16 countries move domestic interest rates upwards. 
                                                            
3 Canuto and Cavallari (2013) discuss whether central banks should incorporate indicators of financial stability into the 
reaction function. While one may associate asset prices with home and equity markets, private sector credit could indicate 
as well the extent of bank lending to the private sector. We might as well consider alternative factors to the exchange rate 
such as private credit, money growth and other financial conditions. 
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We start by estimating the Taylor-rule equations in (1) by fixed-effects (FE) ordinary least 
squares, which produces consistent estimators for large samples. Thereafter, we employ SGMM 
estimations. Under this technique, lags and lagged differences of their own are used to instrument 
endogenous variables. This provides more robust estimations when the autoregressive process 
becomes persistent. Moreover, there are reasons established from economic theory that justify the 
reverse causation from interest rates in the central bank’s rule to the real economy. Interest rate 
changes have well-known effects on aggregate demand components: increases in interest rates lower 
consumption expenditures and desired investment on capital purchases, thus contracting output. A 
contractionary monetary policy also reduces inflation, although with a lag as well document in VAR 
models of the “price puzzle”. In addition, increases in home interest rates – for given interest rates 
abroad (U.S. interest rates in this case) – imply a higher rate of depreciation of the exchange rate by 
uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition. All these channels suggest that interest rate changes have 
an effect on the economy (rate of growth of prices of goods and services and economic growth rate), 
as well as on the financial price of the open economy (the exchange rate). 
 In order to deal with potential over identification problems that arise from using SGMM when 
the time dimension of the panel is large relative to the number of countries, instruments will be 
restricted by using the collapse procedure proposed by Roodman (2009). We limit the number of lags 
in time for the collapse procedure such that the number of instruments becomes smaller than the 
number of cross-section units. 
A recent application of the technique to the topic has been proposed by Poon and Lee (2014) 
for a sample of 10 ASEAN economies (3 of which are IT-targeters: Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Thailand) from 1990 to 2010 (annual data). They find first, under fixed-effects methods, that “the 
coefficients of real exchange rate when setting interest rates are highly significant in the non-IT 
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countries as compared with the IT countries despite their lower magnitude. One possible explanation 
is that IT countries attempt to “lean against the wind”, in which the IT group attempts to minimize 
the exchange rate fluctuation by using the interest rates (Poon and Lee 2014). When they switch to 
dynamic panels, however, the impact of the real exchange rate becomes mixed: varying from positive 
and statistically significant at 10% in dynamic generalized method of moments (DGMM) to negative 
and not statistically significant in SGMM. We believe that further work - using different samples of 
countries, frequency (quarterly observations), time period, and methodological assumptions on the 
policy rule (1) - is needed to verify the robustness of the exchange rate factor in the interest rate policy 
rule under dynamic panels. 
4. Econometric results 
4.1 Fixed effects estimations 
Table 2 presents the estimations of equation (1) employing fixed-effects least-squares 
estimation techniques. Since a bias exist in fixed effects estimations when a lagged dependent variable 
is included in the right hand side, we also present a static version of equation (1) in columns (1) to 
(4), along with the dynamic version in (5) to (8). For the static model, column (1) estimates a simpler 
version of the Taylor rule that controls only for inflation and the output gap. Column (2) includes the 
exchange rate as an additional regressor, while columns (3) and (4) control also for the effect of the 
financial crisis and whether the country has adopted IT or not. The models without lagged interest 
rates in the first 4 columns suggest between 27% and 35% (using R2 between; much larger for R2 
overall) of the variations in interest rates are explained by the regressors listed, with the traditional 
Taylor rule components in the lower bound of 27%. Adding the persistence of lagged interest rates 
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brings the figures to the 73%-74% range, which is close to the values reported by Aizenman et al. 
(2011) for their earlier sample with fixed-effects methods. 
Comparing the static and dynamic models results we observe first a contrasting impact of 
inflation on the interest rates. When the lagged dependent variable is excluded from the model, 
inflation presents a positive expected coefficient, which is statistically significant at the 1% level in 
every case. Inflation is not, however, significant in a dynamic set up. For our main variable of interest, 
the changes in the exchange rate, we observe positive and statistically significant coefficients under 
both specifications. However, the coefficients are larger and pose a higher statistical significance 
under the static model (5% level) than under the dynamic specification (10%). The positive responses 
are consistent with central banks moving up interest rates when the home currency depreciates. 
Looking at the effects of the crisis on interest rates, we only observe meaningful coefficients (and 
negative, as expected) when we estimate the static specification. In the case of the output gap change, 
this variable was never statistically significant (yet changing signs across models), and this could 
imply that the central banks may not be as much concerned about GDP growth than about inflation 
as far as monetary policy response is needed. 
Overall, the static model appears more reasonable than the dynamic one in Table 2 due to the 
estimated responses. In the dynamic model the R2 improves (due to high persistence of the lag of 
monetary policy) but all else (than exchange rate changes) is not statistically significant in columns 
(5)-(8). A problem we still observe in these dynamic specifications of the fixed-effect models is that 
of endogeneity between, for instance, the interest rate and inflation or between the interest rate and 
the exchange rate. In what follows, we address this potential problem by employing SGMM 
estimations, which instrument endogenous variables with suitable lags of their own and lagged 
differences. 
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4.2 System GMM estimations 
In Table 3 we replicate the estimations in Table 2 using SGMM estimates. Taking advantage 
of the method, we consider in the estimations of Table 3 inflation and exchange rate variations as 
endogenous, following initially the results from the FE model reported in Table 2. In Tables 4 and 5 
we will next consider output gap also as endogenous to interest rates in the more general SGMM of 
the reaction function. Since the financial crisis dummy was not statistically significant before or in 
these estimations, we exclude this variable from the model and instead add an interaction between the 
IT dummy and the exchange rate change. This allows us to distinguish between how much weight 
inflation targeting economies and non-targeters assign to exchange rate variations. 
In general, the results are qualitatively not very different from those observed in Table 2. In 
the static model, inflation is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in every specification. 
The output gap is always positive but only statistically significant in two of the static model 
specifications at the 10% level. The exchange rate is only relevant in column (4) along with the 
interaction between IT and the dummy variable. The significance of both coefficients suggests that 
the exchange rate is relevant for the reaction function of the central bank but less so for the inflation 
targeters than the non-targeters. This, despite the fact that the IT dummy per se was not statistically 
significant in columns (3) or (4). 
 Moving to the dynamic specification, in addition to the statistical significance of the lagged 
interest rate with high persistence in column (5) at 0.844 or milder persistence in columns (6) to (8), 
we observe again positive and a very strong statistically significant effect of the exchange rate on the 
interest rate. This time, however, larger in size and more statistically relevant than under fixed effects 
estimations. In response to weaker currencies, central banks respond by raising the benchmark interest 
rates. Just as in the static model specification, the IT dummy is not statistically significant but its 
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interaction with the exchange rate variations is negative and statistically significant. Once again, this 
implies that while both inflation targeters and non-targeters are concerned about the exchange rate, 
the former are less reactive to exchange rate variations than the latter. Diagnostic tests for serial 
correlation (first and second order, AB(1) and AB(2), respectively4) and instrument validity (Hansen 
test) are satisfactory in the static and dynamic specifications, for the latter test the number of 
instruments lower (20 to 22) than the number of cross-section units (24).  
4.3 Robustness checks 
In order to investigate further the different effect of the exchange rate on the reaction function 
of central banks, we employ two approaches. First, we split the sample and estimate separately the 
Taylor rule of inflation targeter and non-targeter economies. This allows us to revisit whether inflation 
targeters and non-targeters act differently when facing exchange rate developments. Secondly, we 
partition the sample into two periods: before and after the financial crisis. This explores the possibility 
that the recent financial crisis might have brought a structural change in the way that central banks 
react and manage their policy rate. In what follows, we also bring back the financial crisis dummy to 
see if the two groups are affected differently by this shock. Finally, we also control for the potential 
endogeneity of the output gap and instrument it accordingly. 
In Table 4 we present the estimates of the full sample and the two subsamples of inflation 
targeters and non-targeters. The results for the full sample are very much in line with the previous 
results where only the lagged interest rate and the nominal exchange rate variations were statistically 
significant. Interestingly, when we split the sample the nominal exchange rate remains statistically 
significant only across those economies that do not target inflation. Meanwhile, the inflation rate now 
                                                            
4 For the static model, the absence of first order serial correlation tests is relevant, while for the dynamic model second 
order serial correlation test is most important. 
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shows a positive and statistically significant coefficient across the group of inflation targeting 
economies. These results suggest that central banks in inflation targeting and non-targeting economies 
do not react as much to economic growth and put different weights on their reaction functions when 
considering inflation and the exchange rate variations.5 
In Table 5 we estimate the model partitioning the sample in two periods, the period before the 
financial crisis, third quarter of 2007, and the period after. We first notice the much higher persistence 
of the interest rate in the post crisis period: lagged coefficient of 0.48 versus 0.86 during crisis. This 
suggests a considerable amount of inertia in monetary policy more recently, with inflation as the only 
other factor of relevance. In fact, when looking at the inflation rate coefficients we see that those are 
statistically significant in all columns after the crisis but not before it. Comparing the most complete 
specification in columns (3) and (6), inflation is in fact not statistically significant before the crisis 
but significant at the 1% level afterwards. Paying closer attention to the coefficient of exchange rate 
variations, this is only statistically relevant in the pre-crisis period. In column (3) while the IT dummy 
is not statistically relevant, its interaction with the exchange rate is negative and significant. As before, 
the partial effect of the exchange rate is smaller for inflation targeting countries than for non-targeters. 
On the other hand, the exchange rate variations are not statistically relevant following the financial 
crisis, neither for non-targeters nor for targeters. 
It is useful to place in context the estimates of the previous tables across methods that either 
take the economy as exogenous to monetary policy or allow the economy to respond to monetary 
policy. Fixed-effect models in Table 2 indicate an exchange rate coefficient of about 0.192 or 0.195 
in columns (2) to (4). In Table 3, with the lagged dependent variable, estimates of the exchange rate 
                                                            
5 The caveat for the subsample of ITers with only 9 countries in columns (4) to (6) of Table 4 is that some serial correlation 
shows up at around the 5% significance level. 
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coefficient vary between 0.293 and 0.400 in columns (6) to (8), which reinforces the role of interest 
rate changes on the economy under SGMM. Moreover, if we confine ourselves to non-ITers countries 
only in Table 4 estimates of the exchange rate coefficient vary between 0.563 and 0.587 in columns 
(9) and (8), suggesting an even larger response to currency movements in countries that do not adopt 
IT. Central banks in these countries put, presumably, less weight on rules in the conduct of monetary 
policy and therefore may be more inclined to move up the benchmark rate when currency changes. 
They may do so for anchoring inflation expectations or for making interest rates more attractive to 
attract capital inflows: the interest rate defense of the 1990s examined by Flood and Rose (2002). 
Similarly, for the partition in Table 5 for the years before the crisis estimates of the exchange rate 
coefficient vary between 0.560 and 0.587 in columns (1) to (3) of Table 5. These figures are in about 
the same range as those in Table 4 for non-ITers just discussed. One interpretation might be that 
during 2000-2007 there was, on average, more deviation from rules than since the crisis onwards led 
emerging markets to follow more discipline and thus respond primarily to macroeconomic 
developments, such as inflation. 
Overall, these robustness checks suggest that inflation targeting and non-targeting countries 
react differently to exchange rate developments with the former group having a more passive attitude 
towards exchange rate variations than the latter. This matches insights by minimizing a loss function 
in Aizenman et al. (2011) and also discussed by Edwards (2006), who stated that “… if the authorities 
have modeled the economy correctly (and, in doing so, have incorporated the effects of e on  and 
y), there is no need to include an exchange rate term in (the IT) equation.” We also observe a structural 
change in the way that central banks react to the exchange rate and other variables in their reaction 
function, with a more reactive attitude towards inflation and less role for exchange rate changes in 
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influencing monetary policy after the financial crisis when monetary policy in emerging markets 
responds only to its own past and inflation rate movements. 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
In this paper we employ an augmented Taylor rule to model the reaction function of the central 
bank with the objective of modeling the interest rate-exchange rate relationship within the context of 
emerging markets. Building on previous literature assessing this relationship, we reexamine the 
relevance of the exchange rate across a sample of 24 EMEs: 9 inflation targeters and 15 non-targeters. 
Relying first on a fixed effects model, we observe that the exchange rate plays an important role in 
the central bank policy rule. When we consider the endogeneity of the inflation rate and the exchange 
rate in our model, our results confirm the persistence of the exchange rate on the EMEs reaction 
function, yet with far less importance for the inflation targeting economies when compared with non-
targeters.  
We test the robustness of our results by splitting the sample of countries across groups and 
time. First, we partition the sample separating inflation targeters from non-targeters. The results of 
this experiment show that the exchange rate has a positive and statistically significant effect on the 
reaction function of the non-inflation targeters group only. Second, when we split the sample before 
and after the recent financial crisis, the effect of the exchange rate on the central bank reaction 
function vanishes. This suggests that there is likely to be a structural change in the way central banks 
react to the exchange rate and other variables in their reaction function, with a more reactive attitude 
towards inflation and a lesser role for exchange rate changes in influencing monetary policy.   
As floating exchange rate mechanisms have become increasingly more popular in emerging 
markets, reconsidering the nexus between interest rates and exchange rate movements becomes an 
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important endeavor as it sheds new light on the empirical question as to whether exchange rates are 
determined by factors other than interest rate differentials in emerging market economies. Our results 
show that central banks of EMEs that follow IT rules react only to inflation movements, suggesting 
a limited role for other factors in the policy rule. For non-IT countries, an adjustment term related to 
exchange rate movements appears as statistically significant, which might be suggestive that currency 
volatility could be linked to the policy rule for this set of countries that do not target inflation. 
Our results suggest that despite the low GDP growth environment observed in the period post 
financial crisis, central banks in EMEs do not react to variations in their output gap. While further 
research into this matter is warranted, this finding suggests that central banks in EMEs have been 
more cautious in their monetary policy stances and are nowadays more concerned about price stability 
than about short-term economic growth. In line with this, our results seem to corroborate the argument 
that IT can be classified as a macroeconomic policy tool that lends transparency and credibility to 
monetary policy while supporting the monetary authorities to adopt a monetary policy framework 
that creates incentives for long-term price stability. In simple terms, following an approach akin to 
the IT mechanism seems to be useful in helping central banks anchor expectations about price 
movements, making macroeconomic management easier (see World Bank, 2014). 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that although there seems to be an emerging consensus in the 
literature that central banks have tended to pursue price stability as one of their primary objectives, 
the adoption of an IT regime may not be the most appropriate solution for all countries. As argued by 
Eichengreen et al. (1999) and Mishkin (2004), for example, to be successful with the adoption of an 
IT policy, countries need to meet certain criteria that rest on an improved understanding of the 
monetary transmission channels and on the capacity of the central bank to actually pursue price 
stability with technical competence and without political interference. For countries that do not meet 
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these pre-conditions, an interim option is to resort to a forward-looking approach to monetary policy, 
with interest-rate focused operating procedures to achieve inflation objectives until the pre-conditions 
to adopt a fully-fledged IT regime can be put in place (Laurens et al., 2015). 
  
23 
 
References 
Agénor, Pierre-Richard, and Luiz A. Pereira da Silva (2013). Rethinking Inflation Targeting: A 
Perspective from the Developing World. University of Manchester, Centre for Growth and Business 
Cycle Research, Economic Studies, Discussion Paper Series, Number 185, July 2013. 
Aizenman, Joshua, Michael Hutchison, and Ilan Noy (2011). Inflation Targeting and Real Exchange 
Rates in Emerging Markets. World Development 39 (5): 712-724. 
Ball, Laurence, and Niamh Sheridan (2005). Does Inflation Targeting Matter? In: The Inflation 
Targeting Debate. NBER Studies in Business Cycles 32. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Batini, Nicoletta and Douglas Laxton (2007). Under what conditions can inflation targeting be 
adopted? The experience of inflation targeting in emerging markets, in: Monetary Policy under 
Inflation Targeting, edited by Frederic Mishkin and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Santiago, Chile.  Central 
Bank of Chile. 
Bernanke, B. (2003), A Perspective on Inflation Targeting, The Federal Reserve Board, Washington, 
DC. 
Berganza, Juan Carlos, and Carmen Broto (2012). Flexible Inflation Targets, Forex Interventions and 
Exchange Rate Volatility in Emerging Countries. Journal of International Money and Finance 31: 
428-444. 
Brito, R. D., & Bystedt, B. (2010). Inflation targeting in emerging economies: Panel evidence. 
Journal of Development Economics 91 (2): 198–210.  
Cabral, René (2010). Why Dollarization Didn’t Succeed: Comparing Credibility and the Impact of 
Real Shocks on Small Open Economies. North American Journal of Economics and Finance 21 (3): 
297-313. 
Canuto, Otaviano and Matheus Cavallari (2013). Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Regulation: 
Whither Emerging Markets, The World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper 6310. 
Civcir, Irfan and Anil Akcaglayan (2010). Inflation Targeting and the Exchange Rate: Does it Matter 
in Turkey? Journal of Policy Modeling 32: 339-354. 
Edwards, S. (2006). The Relationship between Exchange Rates and Inflation Targeting Revisited. 
NBER Working Paper No. 12163, April. 
Eichengreen, B., P. Masson, M. Savastano, and S. Sharma (1999). Transition Strategies and Nominal 
Anchors on the Road to Greater Exchange-Rate Flexibility. In Essays in International Economics, N. 
213. International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University. 
Flood, Robert, and Andrew Rose (2002). Uncovered Interest Parity in Crisis. IMF Staff Papers 49 
(2): 252-266. 
24 
 
Fraga, Arminio, Ilan Goldfajn, and André Minella (2003). Inflation Targeting in Emerging Market 
Economies, NBER Working Paper No. 10019. 
Frankel, Jeffrey, and Jumana Poonawala (2010). The Forward Market in Emerging Currencies: Less 
Biased than in Major Currencies. Journal of International Money and Finance 29: 585-598. 
Garcia, C. J., Restrepo, J. E., & Roger, S. (2011). How much should inflation targeters care about the 
exchange rate? Journal of International Money and Finance 30 (7): 1590–1617.  
International Monetary Fund, 2005. Global Financial Stability Report. Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund. 
Lane, Philip and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (2007). The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised 
and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, Journal of International Economics 73: 
223-250. 
Laurens, B., K. Eckhold, D. King, N. Maehle, A. Naseer, and A. Durré (2015). The Journey to 
Inflation Targeting: Easier Said than Done. The Case for Transitional Arrangements along the Road. 
IMF Working Paper WP/15/136. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
Leitemo, K., & Söderström, U. (2005). Simple monetary policy rules and exchange rate uncertainty. 
Journal of International Money and Finance, 24(3), 481–507.  
Loayza, Norman and Raimundo Soto (2002). Inflation Targeting: Design, Performance, Challenges, 
Central Bank of Chile, Santiago, Chile. 
Mishkin, Frederic, 2004, Can Inflation Targeting Work in Emerging Market Countries? NBER 
Working Paper 10646.  
Mishkin, Frederic and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (2007a). Does Inflation Targeting Make a Difference?, 
NBER Working Paper No. 12876. 
Mishkin, Frederic and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (2007b). Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting, 
Central Bank of Chile, Santiago, Chile. 
Mollick, André V., Cabral, René, and Carneiro, Francisco G. (2008). Does Inflation Targeting Matter 
for Output Growth? Evidence from Industrial and Emerging Economies. World Bank Working Policy 
Paper (WP # 4791), December of 2008. 
Mollick, André V., Cabral, René, and Carneiro, Francisco G. (2011). Does Inflation Targeting Matter 
for Output Growth? Evidence from Industrial and Emerging Economies. Journal of Policy Modeling 
33: 537-551. 
Moura, Marcelo, and Alexandre de Carvalho (2010). What can Taylor Rules say about Monetary 
Policy in Latin America? Journal of Macroeconomics 32: 392-404. 
Nogueira, Reginaldo, and Miguel León-Ledesma (2009). Fear of Floating in Brazil: Did Inflation 
Targeting Matter? North American Journal of Economics and Finance 20: 255-266. 
25 
 
Oudiz, G. and J. Sachs (1984) Macroeconomic policy coordination among the industrial economies, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 1-64. 
Pavasuthipaisit, R. (2010). Should inflation-targeting central banks respond to exchange rate 
movements? Journal of International Money and Finance, 29(3), 460–485.  
Poon, Wai Ching, and Yong Shen Lee (2014). Inflation Targeting in ASEAN-10. South African 
Journal of Economics 82 (1): 141-157. 
Roodman, D. (2009). A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments. Oxford Bulletin of Economics 
and Statistics 71 (1): 135–158. 
Roger, S. (2009). Inflation targeting at 20: Achievements and challenges. IMF working paper no. 
09/236. 
Rossi, Barbara (2013). Exchange Rate Predictability. Journal of Economic Literature 51 (4): 1063-
1119. 
Taylor, J.B. (1985) International coordination in the design of macroeconomic policy rules, European 
Economic Review 28, 53-81. 
Taylor, J. B. (2001). The role of the exchange rate in monetary policy rules. American Economic 
Review, 91:263–67(2), 263–267. 
Taylor, J.B. (2013) International monetary coordination and the great deviation, Journal of Policy 
Modeling 35, 463-472. 
Wollmershäuser, T. (2006). Should central banks react to exchange rate movements? An analysis of 
the robustness of simple policy rules under exchange rate uncertainty. Journal of Macroeconomics, 
28(3), 493–519.  
World Bank (2014). Risk and Opportunity – Managing Risk for Development. World Development 
Report 2014. The World Bank. Washington, DC. 
 
 
  
26 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Countries Inflation Interest rate 
GDP 
growth 
Nominal 
exchange 
rate 
change 
Brazil 6.62 14.04 3.17 1.23 
Colombia 5.07 6.52 4.35 0.57 
Czech Republic 2.37 2.09 2.64 -0.47 
Hungary 4.98 7.56 1.90 0.30 
Israel 1.92 4.07 3.43 -0.01 
Mexico 4.72 7.42 2.20 0.91 
Peru 2.72 3.76 5.81 -0.19 
Philippines 4.28 6.06 5.10 0.20 
Poland 3.01 6.13 3.65 0.03 
ITers average 3.97 6.41 3.58 0.28 
Argentina 9.43 12.14 4.43 4.41 
Bangladesh 6.51 5.56 5.94 0.71 
Bulgaria 4.98 2.21 3.44 -0.08 
China 2.27 5.87 9.87 -0.49 
Costa Rica 8.72 11.40 4.34 0.97 
Dominican Republic 10.21 12.84 5.16 1.91 
Ecuador 13.01 8.96 4.50 0.00 
El Salvador 2.90 3.62 1.92 0.00 
Indonesia 7.47 9.67 5.42 1.09 
Malaysia 2.22 2.89 4.71 -0.03 
Morocco 1.64 3.43 4.55 0.00 
Nigeria 11.66 12.67 8.05 1.04 
Pakistan 8.50 10.45 4.40 1.15 
Panama 2.96 2.06 7.27 0.00 
Tunisia 3.81 4.20 4.80 0.74 
Non-ITers average 6.27 7.15 5.15 0.73 
Full sample average 5.50 6.90 4.63 0.58 
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Table 2. Fixed effects model (OLS) 
Notes: Newey-West robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation are reported in parenthesis. The symbols *, **, and *** refer 
to levels of significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively 
 
 
 
 Variables Static Model Dynamic Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Lagged interest rate         0.804*** 0.773*** 0.770*** 0.770*** 
          (0.074) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) 
Inflation 0.493*** 0.476*** 0.491*** 0.491*** 0.064 0.072 0.077 0.077 
  (0.059) (0.056) (0.053) (0.053) (0.070) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) 
Output gap change 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Exchange rate change   0.192** 0.195** 0.195**   0.097* 0.098* 0.098* 
    (0.093) (0.092) (0.092)   (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
Crisis dummy     -1.279*** -1.279***     -0.276 -0.276 
      (0.349) (0.349)     (0.180) (0.180) 
IT dummy       -3.665*       -0.872 
        (2.210)       (1.396) 
                  
Constant 6.977** 6.338*** 6.348*** 6.348*** 1.752* 1.629* 1.653* 1.653* 
  (2.814) (2.272) (2.272) (2.272) (1.013) (0.979) (0.979) (0.979) 
                  
Observations 1261 1261 1261 1261 1257 1257 1257 1257 
R2 overall 0.611 0.647 0.653 0.653 0.854 0.863 0.863 0.863 
R2 between 0.268 0.335 0.347 0.347 0.726 0.742 0.743 0.743 
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Table 3. SGMM Results. 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. The Hansen test reports that under the null the over-identified restrictions 
are valid. AB(1) and AB(2) corresponds to Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation of first and second order, both under the null of no autocorrelation. 
The p-values for the Hansen test and the Arellano-Bond test of second order autocorrelation (AB(2)) are shown in brackets. The symbols *, **, and 
*** refer to levels of significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  
Variables Static Model Dynamic Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lagged interest rate         0.844*** 0.687*** 0.687*** 0.629*** 
          (0.059) (0.117) (0.117) (0.109) 
Inflation 0.531*** 0.483*** 0.483*** 0.461*** 0.027 0.091 0.090 0.107* 
  (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.048) (0.121) (0.068) (0.069) (0.061) 
Output gap 0.003* 0.002 0.002 0.002* -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Exchange rate change   0.344 0.348 0.617***   0.293** 0.293** 0.400*** 
    (0.232) (0.229) (0.237)   (0.138) (0.138) (0.063) 
IT dummy (dIT)     0.399 0.596     0.037 0.153 
      (1.051) (1.112)     (0.332) (0.430) 
Exchange rate change * dIT       -0.588**       -0.372*** 
        (0.234)       (0.048) 
Constant 4.210*** 4.298*** 4.135*** 4.089*** 0.865** 1.513* 1.498* 1.749** 
  (0.514) (0.511) (0.655) (0.674) (0.344) (0.826) (0.866) (0.815) 
                  
Observations 1261 1261 1261 1261 1257 1257 1257 1257 
Countries 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
No. Instruments 22 22 21 22 22 20 21 22 
AB(1) 1.146 -0.939 -0.946 -1.080 -1.105 -1.337 -1.337 -1.348 
       p-value [0.252] [0.348] [0.344] [0.280] [0.269] [0.181] [0.181] [0.178] 
AB(2) -1.280 -0.876 -0.883 -0.758 -1.500 -1.005 -1.004 -0.915 
p-value [0.201] [0.381] [0.377] [0.448] [0.134] [0.315] [0.315] [0.360] 
Hansen 23.369 22.354 20.390 20.680 19.638 17.582 17.651 18.876 
p-value [0.221] [0.217] [0.203] [0.191] [0.354] [0.285] [0.281] [0.219] 
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Table 4. SGMM Results. Sample partition: ITers and Non-ITers. 
Notes: see Table 3. 
 
  
  
Variables Full Sample ITers NITers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
                    
Lagged interest rate 0.890*** 0.717*** 0.712*** 0.753*** 0.759*** 0.728*** 0.851*** 0.363** 0.357* 
  (0.064) (0.120) (0.119) (0.057) (0.055) (0.067) (0.048) (0.175) (0.195) 
Inflation -0.016 0.023 0.030 0.418*** 0.411*** 0.443*** -0.035 0.081 0.060 
  (0.136) (0.070) (0.070) (0.102) (0.097) (0.139) (0.158) (0.062) (0.120) 
Output gap -0.093 -0.106 -0.107 0.033 0.030 0.015 -0.164 -0.241 -0.247 
  (0.071) (0.091) (0.091) (0.036) (0.033) (0.027) (0.171) (0.250) (0.277) 
Exchange rate change   0.323** 0.326**   0.010 0.031   0.587*** 0.563*** 
    (0.137) (0.137)   (0.016) (0.027)   (0.085) (0.033) 
Crisis dummy     -0.302     -1.158     3.601 
      (0.202)     (1.421)     (14.959) 
                    
Constant 0.662** 1.524 1.558 -0.132 -0.150 0.046 1.077 3.509*** 3.220*** 
  (0.323) (0.956) (0.957) (0.309) (0.282) (0.316) (0.680) (1.297) (0.788) 
                    
Observations 1257 1257 1257 507 507 507 750 750 750 
Countries 24 24 24 9 9 9 15 15 15 
No. Instruments 22 21 22 7 9 9 13 13 13 
AB(2) -1.641 -1.041 -1.047 -1.971 -1.914 -2.034 -1.706 -0.592 -0.684 
p-value [0.101] [0.298] [0.295] [0.049] [0.056] [0.042] [0.088] [0.554] [0.494] 
Hansen 21.203 18.291 18.516 1.698 3.482 1.747 10.894 12.372 10.123 
p-value [0.269] [0.307] [0.295] [0.637] [0.481] [0.627] [0.283] [0.135] [0.182] 
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Table 5. SGMM Results. Sample partition: before and after the financial crisis. 
 Variables 
  
Before Crisis After Crisis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Lagged interest rate 0.482*** 0.479*** 0.479*** 0.862*** 0.864*** 0.863*** 
  (0.137) (0.136) (0.120) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
Inflation 0.130** 0.136** 0.119 0.123*** 0.124*** 0.122*** 
  (0.065) (0.064) (0.075) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Output gap -0.138 -0.135 -0.151 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.130) (0.129) (0.135) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Exchange rate change 0.561*** 0.560*** 0.587*** 0.011 0.010 0.021 
  (0.094) (0.095) (0.062) (0.013) (0.012) (0.045) 
IT dummy (dIT)  0.977 0.860  0.044 0.045 
   (0.838) (0.923)  (0.125) (0.133) 
Exchange rate change * dIT   -0.464***   -0.012 
    (0.179)   (0.043) 
Constant 3.335*** 2.953** 3.029*** 0.096 0.067 0.076 
  (1.244) (1.193) (1.113) (0.142) (0.161) (0.170) 
        
Obs. 652 652 652 605 605 605 
N 23 23 23 24 24 24 
No. Instruments 21 22 22 21 22 23 
AB(2) -0.557 -0.563 -0.590 -0.187 -0.184 -0.199 
       p-value [0.577] [0.573] [0.556] [0.852] [0.854] [0.842] 
Hansen 19.442 19.260 19.126 20.141 20.093 20.325 
       p-value [0.246] [0.255] [0.262] [0.214] [0.216] [0.206] 
Notes: see Table 3. 
